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Abstract
This study provides an empirical assessment of the factors that significantly influence the
long−run transnational corporations' investment decision making process in Sub−Sahara
Africa. The empirical evidence based on a co−integration analysis of 19 countries suggests
that the most dominant long−run determinants of FDI in Sub−Sahara Africa are market
growth, export−orientation policy and FDI liberalisation. These are followed by real
exchange rates and market size. Bottom on the list is openness. However, the results for real
wage rates and human capital are inconclusive.
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become increasingly recognized to provide a package of 
external resources that can contribute to economic development.1 Thus, if well managed, it 
offers either a complementary or alternative channel through which host countries can 
stimulate and sustain their economic growth rates. Therefore, it is instrumental to identify 
those factors that have the potential to either impede or induce FDI flows into host countries. 
Needless to say, it is essential to recognize that in fact, FDI offers a mixture of positive and 
negative effects. It is then the task of the host country to disentangle these effects, and take 
measures that maximize the positives but minimize the negatives.2 
The literature has provided several alternatives of the determinants of FDI.
3 A thorough 
theoretical and empirical literature review is documented in UNCTC (1992). A view which 
in a way embraces the concepts of most of the other explanations is that, which suggests that 
the propensity for a firm to engage in foreign production depends on a combination of 
ownership-specific advantages, internalization opportunities and locational advantages in the 
target market. These reasons, which explain why FDI takes place at all, are encapsulated in 
Dunning’s (1981) eclectic paradigm of FDI. It asserts that a firm can only capture a foreign 
market through FDI if it has the capacity to exploit simultaneously all the three advantages.  
Despite the high profitability of the investments undertaken in the sub-continent, and 
despite offering a number of incentives to foreign investors, many Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) 
countries are not even listed for consideration by transnational corporations (TNCs). In fact, 
they frequently do not make it to the short list when it comes to locational decisions for FDI. 
Consequently, the level of FDI flows to SSA has increased only modestly in recent years 
rendering the FDI position of the sub-region comparatively poor, probably suggesting a 
serious problem with its locational advantages. Thus, as far as SSA is concerned, it is 
instrumental to understand the factors that are either impeding or that have the potential to 
stimulate and sustain FDI flows into the region. 
In view of the aforementioned factors, this study aims to provide an empirical assessment 
of the factors that significantly influence the TNCs’ investment decision-making process in 
SSA. The investigation builds on previous research and focuses on the macro locational 
determinants of FDI. Since as aforementioned, the SSA FDI situation has tended to be 
‘perpetual’, the investigation deviates from the tradition short-term approach and focuses on 
the long-run factors. The study employs both individual country data and panel data analysis 
techniques. This approach enables identification of similarities and/or differences between 
countries, and across the entire sample. The empirical analysis comprises 19 SSA countries 
namely Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The choice of these countries and that of 
the sample period (1970-2000) has been influenced by the availability of FDI data.  
The paper is therefore organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the time-
series trends of FDI in Africa. The theoretical framework, methodology, measurement of 
variables, and data sources and limitations are discussed in section 3. The empirical results 
are presented in section 4, and concluding remarks are contained in section 5. 
 
2  FDI trends in Africa 
 
**Figure 1** 
FDI flows into Africa were rather static prior to 1980. The exception was in 1974 and 1979 
when heavy investment was made in oil producing countries during and following the oil 
                                                           
1 For details see for instance UNCTAD (1999).  
2 Bende-Nabende (2002) has covered this comprehensively. 
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3 For instance the product life cycle theory of investment and the follow-the-leader theory of defensive FDI.  crises (Figure 5.1, UNCTAD, 1999). However, as Figure 1 illustrates, in response to 
investment and trade policy liberalization, FDI surged in the early-1980s and peaked in 1989. 
However, it slumped in 19904 before recovering. Among the reasons attributed to this 
increase is the degree of investment profitability in Africa. For instance, UNCTAD (1999) 
reports that: (i) in the case of United States (US) FDI, the rate of return in Africa was above 
10 per cent between 1983 and 1997 except in 1986; (ii) since 1990, the rate of return in 
Africa has averaged 29 per cent; (iii) since 1991 the rate of return in Africa has been higher 
than any other region, including developed countries as a group, in many years by a factor of 
two or more; and (iv) in 1995, Japanese affiliates in Africa were more profitable (after taxes) 
than in the early-1990s, and were even more profitable than Japanese affiliates in any other 
region except for Latin America and the Caribbean and West Asia. 
**Figure 2** 
However, an assessment of the trends from a comparative perspective (Figure 2) reveals 
that Africa’s FDI position has been far below the average of developing countries since the 
mid-1980s5. In fact, Figure 3 demonstrates that Africa’s share of FDI to developing countries 
has indeed been declining. UNCTAD (1999) observes that while inflows into developing 
countries (as a group) almost quadrupled, from less than $20 billion between 1981 and 1985 
to an average $75 billion between 1991 and 1995, inflows into Africa only doubled during 
that period. Consequently, Africa’s share in total inflows to developing countries dropped 
significantly. 
**Figure 3** 
Obviously, aggregate FDI flows conceal country-specific information. For example, 
although the share is gradually declining, owing to their oil reserves, Nigeria and Egypt have 
accounted for a substantial share of FDI flows to Africa ranging. For instance, they were 
responsible for 67 per cent share between 1983 and 1987, 54 per cent share between 1988 
and 1992 and 38 per cent share between 1993 and 1997 (UNCTAD, 1999). Furthermore, in 
growth terms, UNCTAD (1999) reports that more recently a group of African countries 
including Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mozambique, Namibia, Tunisia and Uganda 
have attracted rapidly increasing FDI. However, there are countries, which received FDI 
divestments (i.e. Swaziland) and countries where FDI had declined in the recent past but has 
now been reversed (i.e. Mozambique and United Republic of Tanzania).
6 Bennell (1994) 
reports that British Corporate investment fell drastically since mid-1994 following the TNCs’ 
divestments in English Speaking Africa. 
**Table I** 
Traditionally, most of the FDI in Africa originated from a few countries of Western 
Europe and the US7. This later extended to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries and, hence, the Triad.
8 Nonetheless, it is evident from Table 
I that since the mid-1980s although volatile in nature, Africa started to attract significant FDI 
from non-Triad countries including the developing countries of Southeast Asia. Evidently, if 
it were not for these other non-traditional sources, the position of Africa’s share of FDI would 
be worse.  
**Table II** 
FDI in Africa is no longer concentrated in the primary sector9 so much that services and 
manufacturing sectors are becoming key sectors even in oil-exporting countries.10 Table II 
                                                           
4 Resulting from a global recession in response to the Japanese stock market slump. 
5 When the realignment of the major currencies induced global liberalisation of FDI policies followed by an 
FDI boom. 
6 FDI figures for individual countries are reported in the various issues of UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Reports. 
7 Mostly ‘colonial masters’. 
8 The European Union, Japan and US. 
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9 For instance, among the countries under investigation, investment in the primary factor was undertaken 
because of the following natural resources: oil is found in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, illustrates that although the primary sector still dominates the FDI stock in Africa, the 
services and manufacturing sectors surpassed it vis-à-vis annual flows between 1988 and 
1999. UNCTAD (1999) reports that in 1996, FDI from the US was almost as important in the 
manufacturing sector
11 as the traditionally most important sector, petroleum. 
 
3  The theoretical framework and empirical methodology 
3.1  The theoretical framework 
 
This study draws on the existing literature and for simplicity starts from the notion that FDI 
from the locational advantage point of view is influenced by four broad categories of factors. 
These are, the cost-related factors, the investment environment improving factors, other 
macro-economic factors, and the development strategy of the host country.  
Under the first category, the presence of a significant cost factor disparity between a home 
country and a host country may considerably influence the choice of an investment location. 
Such a disparity might be particularly prevalent in the labor-intensive export-oriented, and 
sourcing and assembly type of industries in which major market imperfections arise from the 
disproportionate cost of given unit inputs between the developed countries and the 
developing countries. Key cost-related locational factors will be the host country's real wage 
rate, foreign exchange rates, land and property rents/rates, fuel costs, local input costs (where 
applicable), level of taxation, transport costs, and cost of capital (i.e. lending interest rate) in 
relation to those of the home country. Schreiber (1970) found low cost labor to be the leading 
factor influencing the choice of Taipei, China as an offshore production site; and Hill and 
Lindsey (1987) found it to be a vital influence for export-oriented subsidiaries in the 
Philippines. Likewise, Hollander (1984) found transport costs to be significant in 
determining US firms' sourcing, while Goldberg and Klein (1998) identified a relationship 
between real exchange rates and FDI from Japan and the US into the Southeast Asian 
countries.  
The investment environment improving factors not only make it possible for the 
investment to take place, but also smoothen the entire process of investment and of eventual 
production. The central factors here are seen to be the openness of the economy, the 
liberalization of the investment and the trade regimes, and the prevailing political risk. The 
FDI policy liberalization package may include ownership policies, taxes/subsidies, 
convertibility of currency, price controls, and performance requirements. Trade policy 
liberalization involves the reductions of restrictions and tariffs on traded merchandise 
regarding the countries in question making them more open and acceptable to trade.12 These 
factors may play that crucial role of influencing the investors' preference when making a 
choice between two locations that have similar cost-related advantages. Kravis and Lipsey 
(1982) found that a high propensity to trade was an important factor in the decision to locate 
US transnational affiliates in foreign countries. Furthermore, investment benefits that are 
conditioned by liberalization of the trade and FDI regimes may emanate from their 
facilitation of freer trade and investment in conjunction with the repatriation of dividends and 
profits to home countries. Bende-Nabende et al (2001) found liberalization to be a major 
determinant of FDI into the ASEAN-5 economies. Furthermore, the political risk rating of 
the country cannot be ignored. An unstable political environment makes investments risky 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Nigeria; diamonds are available in Botswana and Central African Republic; gold is in Ghana and copper in 
Zambia; timber in found in the tropical countries of Central African Republic, Gabon, Ghana, and Sierra Leone; 
and agriculture is prominent in almost all the countries. 
10 For example, the primary sector accounted for 30 per cent FDI stock in Nigeria in 1992, while manufacturing 
accounted for almost 50 per cent and services close to 20 per cent. In 1995 almost half of the FDI flows to 
Egypt (48 per cent) went into services, 47 per cent into manufacturing, and a mere 4 per cent into the primary 
sector (UNCTAD, 1999). 
11 Mostly in food and kindred products, primary and fabricated materials, and other manufactured products. 
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12 For details on this see for instance, UNCTAD (1997). and therefore erodes the investors' confidence.13 
Under the macro-economic factors, consideration is made on factors that can in their own 
right influence foreign firms to consider direct investment in the host country as opposed to 
continuing to service it either through exports or through other means14. Here there are two 
market familiar factors, i.e. current market size and the potential market size. While a large 
domestic market size generates scale economies, a growing market improves the prospects of 
market potential. In addition, there are country-specific created assets that take the form of 
the quality of the available infrastructure, technology and manpower, that facilitate the 
production and distribution processes of goods and services. Bhattacharya et al (1996) 
identified gross domestic product (GDP) growth as a major factor for sub-Saharan Africa as 
a whole, while Mbekeani (1997) found market size and growth rates to be the most important 
determinants of FDI in East Asia and Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The political ideology and hence development strategy of the host country also plays a 
critical role, particularly, with respect to the type of investment to be undertaken. For 
instance, it may be a restrictive import-substitution strategy, which draws investment 
(defensive) geared for the domestic market. Alternatively, it may be a less restrictive export-
orientation strategy, which promotes investment for exports. Singh and Jun's (1995) study 
revealed that exports, particularly manufacturing exports, are a significant determinant of FDI 
and that there is strong evidence that exports precede FDI flows.  
Data constraints make it impracticable to test all of these potential determinants of FDI. 
Consequently, a limited number of variables have been selected to represent each of the 
categories in the analysis. The variables and their expected directions of response are 
presented in Table III where the following notation has been adopted: RWR = real wage 
rates,  IR = interest rates, XR = foreign exchange rates, OPEN = openness, LIB = 
liberalization, GDP = current market size, Gr = market growth (future market potential), HC 
= human capital and X = export-orientation development strategy.15  
**Table III** 
This relationship can now be represent in very simple terms as: 
   
]) [ ], , , [ ], , [ ], , , ([ X HC Gr GDP LIB OPEN XR IR RWR f FDI =     (1) 
 
3.2 The  methodology 
 
The literature on FDI has obviously considered the links between FDI and macroeconomic 
performance of host countries, but it has tended, indeed, to do so on the basis of one-way 
causality, in either direction. The exploration of two-way causation is only just beginning. 
There are two main avenues for exploring that interdependency in a simultaneous fashion 
(rather than just establishing 'causality' à la Granger). One is the construction of some form 
of a structural simultaneous equation, dynamic, macro-model. The other is to employ a 
vector auto-regression (VAR) in orthodox format, or in the form of a vector error correction 
(VEC); which is a Johansen (1995) VAR incorporating (potential) error correction terms, 
consequent upon potential co-integrating vectors. The latter avenue is employed in this 
analysis and assesses co-integration or rather long-run relationships between FDI and its 
determinants. Consider a VAR(k) given by: 
 
t t k t k t t t D y B y B y B y ε + Ψ + + + + = − − − ... 2 2 1 1         ( 2 )  
 
                                                           
13 For theoretical details see for instance UNCTAD (1997 and 1999). 
14 Such as licensing. 
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15 It has not been possible to compute the cost related variables as 'host country in relation to home country' 
because the FDI data used is aggregated in nature (i.e. it originates from several countries). where  yt is a column vector of n I(1) and/or I(0) variables; Bi are n by n matrices of 
coefficients; and Dt is a vector of deterministic terms. The Johansen (1995) co-integration 
test re-parameterizes equation (2) into an error correction form: 
 
t t k t k t t t D y y y y ε + Ψ + ∆ Γ + + ∆ Γ + Π = ∆ + − − − − 1 1 1 1 1 ...        ( 3 )  
 
Accordingly, 
   
) ..... ( 2 1 k B B B I − − − − = Π           ( 4 )  
   
Each row of Π is (potentially) a co-integrating vector of yt; and the rank (r) of the stochastic 
matrix determines the actual number of such vectors. Obviously, should the rank turn out to 
be zero then equation (2) becomes a VAR in differences; and should the matrix be of full 
rank, the vector process itself is stationary, so that a standard VAR in levels (equation (3)) is 
the appropriate specification of the relationship between the variables. In the intermediate 
case r (0 < r < n) co-integrating vectors exist. In this case, the stochastic matrix is: 
 
' αβ = Π ; where α and β are n x r         ( 5 )  
 
where β′yt are the co-integrating vectors; and α is a matrix of speed adjustment, which gives 
the response of yt to the error correction terms. This is now a VEC model. This methodology 
is now so familiar that there is no need to say much about it.16 
 
3.3  Measurement and properties of variables, data sources and limitations 
 
The measurement of variables and data sources are reported in the Appendix. The limitations 
of the World Penn Tables have been pointed out by Summers and Heston (1991). They 
include the low reliability of data obtained from the less developed countries, which means 
that biases as well as measurement errors may vary. Consequently, the reliability of the 
analysis based upon the data may be compromised.  
Tests for unit roots, the order of integration and the roots of the companion matrices were 
carried out. The results indicated that the variables' order of integration is 1 or could be so. 
The results also indicated that the VARs and the VECs are stable, there is Normality, and 
there is no evidence of Heteroscedasticity. 
 
4  The empirical results 
 
It is worthwhile noting that empirical results on some of the FDI determinant factors have 
sometimes deviated from theoretical expectations, leading to inconclusive inference. For 
instance, Schmitz and Beiri (1972) found the European Community’s share of total US FDI 
to be negatively (sometimes significantly) related to the European Community growth rate 
during 1952 to 1958. Likewise, Lunn (1980) found the growth rate lagged one year (Yt-1 - Yt-2) 
to be significantly negatively related to US FDI in the European Community. In similar 
manner, Caves (1996) found in some cases the wage rate to have a positive sign. Similarly, 
Bende-Nabende (1999) found growth to be statistically significant and negatively related to 
FDI in Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore. In addition, he found output (as a proxy for 
market size) for Malaysia and Singapore to be statistically insignificant and negatively 
related to FDI. Therefore, there is an indication that the composition of the equation may 
influence both the significance and the direction of the relationship between FDI and some of 
its determinant variables. This could probably be partly attributed to the instrumental 
variables used whose choice is rather subjective, and partly to the fact that because of data 
limitations most models are incomplete. In this investigation, upon running the co-integration 
test for the equation comprising the entire set of the aforementioned determinant variables, 
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16 See for instance Hamilton (1994). the direction of the normalized coefficients for some of the variables contradicted the 
theoretical expectations. Consequently, they did not make economic sense and were 
eliminated from the respective country equations. Therefore, they are referred to as 
eliminated variables hereafter. After experimenting, the best lags turned out to be 3 for 
Zambia; 2 for Central African Republic, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe; 1 for the remaining countries; and 6 for the Pool. 
**Table IV** 
The Osterwald-Lenum (1992) critical values for the trace statistic were used to test for co-
integration. Those for the country specific estimates have been adjusted for small sample 
size.17 The trace statistics reported in Table IV illustrate co-integration (at the 5 per cent 
level) for all the countries. For instance, r = 5 for Mauritius; r = 4 for Kenya, Niger and 
Nigeria; r = 3 for Malawi, Zimbabwe and the Pool; r = 1 for Rwanda, Sierra Leon, South 
Africa, Swaziland and Zambia; and r = 2 for the remaining countries. Evidently, there is 
indeed a long-run relationship between FDI and its determinants in SSA. 
**Table V** 
The standardized co-integration vectors are reported in Table V. It is evident that the most 
consistent long-run determinant of FDI in SSA is market growth, followed by liberalization 
and export-orientation policy. Unfortunately, some countries did not have sufficient time-
series data for human capital stock and real wage rates. Therefore, no general conclusion can 
be drawn about them.  
In the panel co-integration, the results for the Pool are consistent with those for the 
majority of the countries. For instance, concomitant with most of the country results, only the 
co-integration vector for openness is inconsistent with economic theory. Otherwise, all the 
other variables are rightly signed.  
 
5  Conclusion and policy considerations 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that the most dominant long-run determinants of FDI in 
SSA are market growth, export-orientation policy and FDI liberalization. These are followed 
by real exchange rates and market size. Bottom on the list is openness. However, because of 
data limitations no definite conclusion can be drawn from the results for real wage rates and 
human capital. Specifically then, the long-run implication is that SSA countries can improve 
their FDI positions by improving their macroeconomic management, liberalizing their FDI 
regimes and broadening their export bases.  
Of course because of data problems, some factors were not included in the empirical 
analysis. Therefore, it is instructive to address some of these factors here. UNCTAD (1999) 
attributed the poor FDI performance in SSA to the negative image the region holds among 
many foreign investors. For instance, the sub-continent tends to be associated with political 
turmoil, economic instability, diseases and natural disasters. Internal and external armed 
conflicts are its key characteristics. Military coup d'états are also not uncommon. Moreover, 
spillover effects from neighboring countries’ instability often in some way affect those 
countries that experience internal stability. Four decades ago, per capita incomes of SSA 
were almost similar to those of some of the economies of Southeast Asia. However, the post-
independence (political) mismanagement of SSA economies has not only led to economic 
decline, but has also led to comparatively less investment in infrastructure (including human 
capital) than their counter parts in Asia. As a consequence, SSA has lagged behind in terms 
of economic growth in general, and infrastructural development in particular. Infrastructure 
facilitates the production and distribution process of goods and services. Under-investment in 
infrastructure therefore deters FDI. The quality of infrastructure together with the available 
human capital may dictate the type of investment to be undertaken. It is no wonder then that 
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17 This effectively involved correcting for degrees of freedom using the formula (t-nk)/t*lr; where t = actual 
sample size used in the estimation, n = number of variables in the system, k = number of lags used, and lr = log 
likelihood ratio. apart from South Africa, the manufacturing sectors of SSA countries comprise mostly 
processing and a few light manufacturing industries concomitant with the available level and 
quality of infrastructure. Man cannot control natural disasters. However, as exemplified by 
the developed countries, good economic management provides opportunities to have buffer 
resources capable of alleviating the after effects of any such disasters.  
The FDI trends demonstrate that until recently, most FDI in SSA was undertaken in 
natural resources exploration, extraction and processing, and/or agricultural products 
processing concomitant with the host countries’ factor endowments. In addition, FDI mostly 
originated from the OECD countries. However, this is changing. The high profitability of the 
investment undertaken in Africa, its recent diversification into manufacturing and services, 
and its diversification to non-traditional sources imply that Africa indeed has the potential to 
attract FDI. However, in order to achieve this a lot has to be done to change the current 
image the region holds. 
First and foremost, individual countries must sort out their country-specific problems and 
focus on factors that can enhance economic, social and political stability. For instance, it is 
more productive for conflicting countries to resolve their problems via round table 
discussions rather than through the unnecessarily expensive armed conflicts. This helps 
reduce the characteristically heavy defense budgets, and enables the allocation of funds to 
better causes. The developed countries also have a role to play here since they often act as 
suppliers (directly or indirectly) of the expensive and destructive heavy artillery employed in 
these conflicts. The role of the corruption culture, which requires total eradication, need not 
be over emphasized.  
Although low-cost labor remains a source of competitive advantage particularly for 
developing countries, its importance is diminishing. Likewise, the importance of natural 
resources is diminishing as their substitutes are developed. Instead, TNCs are increasingly 
seeking world-class infrastructure, skilled and productive labor, innovatory capacities and an 
agglomeration of efficient suppliers, competitors, support institutions and services. In 
addition, large domestic markets remain a powerful magnet for investors. In fact, low-cost 
labor does not provide a base for sustainable development since rising incomes erode the 
comparative edge it provides. Thus, low-cost labor is only a beginning point for luring FDI 
and consequently generating static economic benefits. Therefore, developing Africa can 
attain sustained economic growth, through the exploitation of TNCs' dynamic competitive 
advantages. Consequently, African countries have to set-up resource bases that can facilitate 
their progressive shifts up the levels of technological complexity. This involves instituting 
plans for deepening the content of export activity and building the human capital and 
macroeconomic capacity to sustain such a shift across a range of tradable activities in 
response to changing world demand and technologies. This is made more challenging by the 
current unprecedented and accelerating pace of technological change, whose developments 
they have to keep pace with. These steps will not only generate sustained growth prospects 
and hence market potential, but will also provide a conducive environment for FDI. 
  7Appendix  Measurement of variables and data sources 
 
FDI = FDI (millions U.S $) - from the Balance of Payments Statistical Yearbook and 
UNCTAD. 
Market size = GDP (billions international prices) - from the Penn World Tables. 
Market growth = growth rate of GDP, i.e. Grt = log GDPt-1 - log GDPt (international prices) - 
computed. 
Openness = total imports and exports (billions international prices) - from the Penn World 
Tables. 
Export orientation development policy = exports (billions international prices) - computed 
from the Penn World Tables. 
Liberalization = dummy variable with 0 representing the pre-liberalization (FDI) period (i.e 
up to 1985) and 1 the post liberalization period (from 1986 onwards). Therefore, it relates to 
only the liberalization of the FDI regimes.  
Real wage rates = hourly wage rates (U.S $) - from the International Labor Statistics. 
Foreign exchange rates = real effective exchange rates - from World Bank web site.  
Human capital = mean years of education - from Nehru and Dhareshhwa (1965-87) at the 
World Bank web site. 1988 -1998 estimated by author.  
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Figure 1:  Trends of FDI flows into Africa. 
Sources:    Various issues of UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports. 
 










































































































Figure 2  Trends of FDI flows to Africa and to the developing countries. 
Note:   DC - Developing countries. 






























Africa LA & C Asi a
Figure 3  Percentage share of FDI flows to developing countries. 
Note:   LA & C - Latin America and Caribbean. 
Sources:    Data from various issues of UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports. 
 
  13Table I  Trends of FDI sources 
 
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Million dollars 
EU
a  142  308.1 1663.6  537.9 1862.2 1221.6 1523.1 824.3 1928.6  3282.6  4339 
US  155 -607  -554  -451  75  -84 837 762 352 737 3790 
Japan  165.5 492.5 457.2 488.9 568.7 121.1 207  152.5 166.6 101.4 160.3 
Triad  462.4 193.6 1566.8  575.8 2506  1258.9 2567.1 1738.7 2447.3  4121  8289.3
Others  2037.5 2606.4 3245.2 1631.2 246.1  1892.3 901.9  3574.2 1697.8 1786  -632.3
Percentage share 
EU
a  5.7  11.0 34.6 24.4 67.7 38.8 43.9 15.5 46.5 55.6 56.7 
US  6.2 -21.7  -11.5  -20.4  2.7 -2.7  24.1  14.3  8.5 12.5  49.5 
Japan 6.6 17.6  9.5 22.2  20.7  3.8 6.0 2.9 4.0 1.7 2.1 
Triad  18.5 6.9  32.6 26.1 91.1 40.0 74.0 32.7 59.0 69.8 108.3 
Others 81.5 93.1 67.4 73.9 8.9  60.1 26.0 67.3 41.0 30.2 -8.3 
Note:  a - Excludes Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
Source:  FDI flows from Annex table 1, UNCTAD (1999). 
  14Table II  Sectoral distribution of FDI in Africa (million dollars) 
 
  FDI inflows  FDI stock 
 1988  1997  1988  1997 
Sectors  value  % share  value  % share value % share  value  % share 
Primary  65  10.1  89  15.3  2338 51.8 17.16 53.4 
Manufacturing  183  28.7 187 32.1  940  20.8 862 26.8 
Services  254  39.7 243 41.8  1235 27.4 635 19.8 
Unspecified 137  21.5  62.5  10.8  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source:  UNCTAD (1999, pp. 418-425). 
Note:  n.a. - data not available or negligible. 
 
  15Table III  The variables and their expected directions of influence 
 
Cost-related Investment  environment 
improving 
Other macro-economic  Policy 
RWR IR  XR  OPEN  LIB  GDP Gr  HC  X 
- - -  +  +  + +  +  + 
 
 
  16Table IV  Trace statistics 
 
 Ho: 
r = p 
Eigenvalue Trace 
statistic 




Botswana  p = 0 









Cameroon  p = 0 









Central Africa  p = 0 









Congo  p = 0 









Gabon  p = 0 









Ghana  p = 0 









Cote d'Ivoire  p = 0 









Kenya  p = 0 
p < = 1 
p < = 2 

















Madagascar  p = 0 









Malawi  p = 0 
p < = 1 













Mauritius  p = 0 
p < = 1 
p < = 2 
p < = 3 





















Niger  p = 0 
p < = 1 
p < = 2 

















Nigeria  p = 0 
p < = 1 
p < = 2 

















Rwanda  p = 0  0.846  104.73**  76.07  84.45 
Sierra Leone  p = 0  0.676  68.7**  59.46  66.52 
South Africa  p = 0  0.741  61.67**  53.12  60.16 
Swaziland  p = 0  0.797  60.68**  53.12  60.16 
Zambia  p = 0  0.84  74.81**  47.21  54.46 
Zimbabwe  p = 0 
p < = 1 













Pool  p = 0 
p < = 1 













Note:  ** - 1 %  and * - 5 % levels of significance. 
  17Table V  Normalised co-integration vectors 
 
 OPEN  LIB  Gr  GDP  HC  RXR  RWR  X 
Botswana  19.6  1.1 290.0  e.v n.a -0.36  -0.09  e.v 
Cameroon  e.v e.v 60.5  e.v 6.8 -0.32  n.a 0.06 
Central  Africa  e.v 0.01  58.7  2.6 n.a n.a n.a 8.8 
Congo  1.3 6.4 250.3  4.6 n.a e.v n.a 4.4 
Gabon  e.v 5.9 7.6 e.v n.a -0.01  n.a 3.7 
Ghana  e.v  0.05 804.5  12.5 62.6 e.v  n.a  e.v 
Cote  d'Ivoire  4.4 30.4  e.v e.v 41.5  -0.02  n.a e.v 
Kenya  0.8 18.5  275.5  3.4 21.3  e.v e.v 2.2 
Madagascar e.v e.v 1.8 0.7 0.1 -0.01  n.a e.v 
Malawi  e.v 1.2 0.1 e.v e.v n.a -0.1  0.9 
Mauritius  e.v e.v e.v 7.6 21.7  -0.2  -7.8  0.9 
Niger  10.7  225.9  11269  1.7 n.a -.8 n.a e.v 
Nigeria  e.v e.v 276.5  0.3 4.7 e.v n.a 0.2 
Rwanda  e.v 0.2 3.1 e.v 0.5 e.v n.a 4.4 
Sierra  Leone  e.v e.v 31.7  e.v 6.0 -0.01  n.a 4.5 
South  Africa  e.v 54.3  2538  e.v n.a e.v n.a 4.0 
Swaziland  0.02  6.0 95.5  e.v n.a n.a e.v e.v 
Zambia  e.v 10.6  169.2  e.v e.v n.a n.a 0.3 
Zimbabwe  23.9  273.5  e.v 136.8  e.v e.v e.v e.v 
Pool  e.v  2.03 21.5 1.1  1.2  -0.02  e.v  0.1 
Note: e.v - eliminated variable, n.a - data not available, and the co-integrating vector for FDI standardized as -1. 
  18